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FRED LANDMAN AND IEKE MOERDIJK 
COMPOSIT IONAL ITY  AND THE ANALYS IS  
OF ANAPHORA*  
The aim of this paper is to discuss the effect of the compositionality 
principle on the form of grammatical rules. More specifically, we will 
investigate how the by now standard analysis of coreference via Rein- 
hart's non-c-command condition can be incorporated in a framework of 
PTQ-style Montague Grammar with a strong version of the com- 
positionality principle. 
In the first part we will extensively discuss the principle of com- 
positionality of meaning and its formalization i  Montague Grammar. 
We will point out that the compositionality principle as such only gains 
its strength through other restrictions on the form of grammatical rules. 
This forces us to be more explicit about what kinds of rules the grammar 
contains. In particular, it motivates the discussion of the role played by 
morphological features in grammatical rules. 
In the second part we will, on the basis of the discussion of the 
compositionality principle, first pay some attention to the question of 
whether a Chomsky-approach to coreference by wellformedness con- 
ditions on outputs at the level of Logical Form is compatible with a 
Compositional Montague Grammar (2.1.). Further, we will investigate 
the relation between compositionality and a strong version of Partee's 
wellformedness constraint. This version prohibits the use of indexed 
pronouns in the syntax, and therefore it leads to an analysis which is 
radically different from Montague's original analysis (Section 2.2.). In 
Section 2.3. we will consider the original (weaker) version of the 
wellformedness constraint, which allows indexed pronouns and is better 
behaved with respect to compositionality. Starting with Montague's 
original substitution rule and Bennett's analysis of reflexives, we will 
consider several modifications which incorporate Reinhart's non-c- 
command condition. At the level of syntax, this theory roughly makes 
the same predictions regarding coreference as does Reinhart's original 
theory. At the semantic level, however, our approach will be seen to 
have several advantages. 
As will be apparent from this short survey, our interests in this paper 
are of a rather abstract and theoretical nature. It is the effect of 
compositionality onthe form of the grammar that we are concerned with 
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here, rather than problems of a more empirical character. Thus, for 
example, we will not present an alternative to Reinhart's analysis of 
coreference, but investigate the theoretical consequences of incorporat- 
ing such an analysis in Montague Grammar. 
1. COMPOSIT IONAL ITY  
Linguistic theory deals with intuitions of native speakers about their 
languages. In particular, part of the theory has to deal with semantic 
intuitions. What are these, what should we require a semantic theory to 
deal with? It is not the aim of this paper to try to give a complete answer 
to this question. But there are some obvious points one can make: it is 
evident hat speakers have intuitions about correct arguments, i.e. about 
entailment relations between sentences. So let us require that semantics 
should at least give a theory of entailment. It is also evident hat there 
are intuitions about word meaning, or constituent meaning, i.e. about 
which words are synonymous, which words have more than one mean- 
ing, and for which words it holds that the meaning of the one is 
contained in the meaning of the other. (However, speakers do not seem 
to have clear intuitions about what kinds of entities these (constituent) 
meanings are.) Obviously, intuitions about constituent meanings and 
intuitions about the entailment relation are tightly connected, so let us 
require that semantics should clarify this connection. 
There is an interesting claim on this connection (going back to Frege), 
the principle of compositionality, which says that the meaning of a 
compound expression is a function of the meaning of its constituents, 
and of the way these constituents are combined. 
We will not enter into the philosophical discussion on what kind of 
entities meanings are. We accept as such the concept of intension from 
possible world semantics (i.e. functions from indices to extensions), 
which, besides being an intuitively acceptable concept, has at present no 
serious rival in explaining a diversity of semantical facts. We can then 
formulate the compositionality principle more tentatively as follows: the 
intension of a compound expression is completely determined by (a) the 
intensions of the parts, and (b) the way these parts are put together (cf. 
Janssen (1978)). 
Following Janssen's interpretation of compositionality, the principle 
admits only these grammars in which the meaning of an expression a
can be calculated by means of a restricted and explicitly defined class of 
operations from the meanings of the expressions occurring in the 
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derivation of a, together with the operations on these meanings induced 
by the syntactic rules used in the derivation of a .  
It should be stressed that the compositionality principle as such has no 
empirical content: it only excludes unwanted meanings if severe restric- 
tions are put on what possible derivations can be, and in particular, on 
which operations on meanings can be induced by the syntactic rules. For 
example, if in some way reference to derivational history is allowed in 
the formulation of syntactic rules, the compositionality principle loses 
much of its impact. It will be possible to be more explicit about this 
point after having presented a more formalized version of the com- 
positionality principle. 
In order to obtain such a formalization of the compositionality prin- 
ciple, let us briefly review the organization of Montague Grammar (MG) 
(following Montague (1973), henceforth PTQ). The syntactic rules of MG 
build up complex expressions out of less complex ones, while simul- 
taneously the semantic interpretations of expressions are built up: every 
expression corresponds to a modeltheoretic object, its meaning (or 
intension). In PTQ this correspondence is mediated by a translation 
function, which translates every lexical item into a formula of a proper 
logical language (here the language of intensional type logic, IL); the 
translation is then modeltheoretically interpreted, thus giving the mean- 
ing of the original expression. An essential consequence of the com- 
positionality constraint is that this logical language IL is dispensable: 
semantics deals with intensions (modeltheoretic objects) of natural an- 
guage expressions; a logical language is used only to refer to these 
intensions more easily. In fact, Montague (1970a) does without it. 
Every rule of the syntax combining syntactic items (strings or struc- 
tures) to produce a new one corresponds with a semantic rule giving the 
meaning (or the translation) of the produced item from the meanings 
(translations) of the input terms. This is one of the essential features of 
MG: rules always come in pairs (S, T) .  S is an n-place function mapping 
n-tuples of strings (PTQ) or labelled bracketings (e.g. Partee (1973)) onto 
a string or labelled bracketing (henceforth lb) a = S(a l  . . . . .  an). Further, 
there is a function mapping syntactic ategories to semantic types, and 
conforming to this function, T maps n-tuples of expressions (e l , . . . ,  en) 
of IL (of the appropriate types) onto an expression e = T(E1 . . . . .  en) of 
IL. If a[ is the translation of ai(i = 1 . . . . .  n), then T(a[  . . . . .  a',) is to be 
the translation of S(a~ . . . . .  an). The only constraint proposed by Montague 
on the form of the syntactic rules S or the translation rules T, is the 
compositionality constraint. Using the terminology introduced above, we 
formulate compositionality as follows: 
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Compositionality Principle (CP). 
Let T be a translation rule (thus corresponding to some 
syntactic rule S), and let M be a model for IL. Then if 
e~ . . . . .  en and ~h,. . - ,  ~/~ are expressions of IL of the ap- 
propriate types (to function as inputs for T), such that e~ is 
equivalent o vi(i = 1 . . . . .  n) in M (i.e. el and Vi have the 
same intension in M), then T(e l , . . . ,e~)  is equivalent o 
T(~/I , . . . ,  ~/n) in M. 
It follows that although T-rules are defined as 'syntactic' operations in 
the grammar of IL, they are essentially operations on meanings, not on 
formulas. If T assigns a meaning m to a complex expression, it does not 
matter which IL-formula serves as the translation of that expression, as 
long as it is an IL-formula which is interpreted as m. It is in this sense 
that the level of the logical language is inessential. In Montague (1970b) 
this constraint is satisfied by representing both syntax and semantics as 
algebras, and the translation operation as a homomorphism from the 
syntax algebra to the semantics algebra, involving only polynomial 
operations. 
"What the CP formalizes is the principle that the translation is a means 
to refer to the meaning of an expression and nothing more than that: if, 
for example, q~(j) represents this meaning adequately, then so does 
3x(q~(x)^x =j) ,  since both expressions refer to the same model- 
theoretic object. This idea implies that no conditions on wellformedness 
referring to variables, constants, or other structural properties of IL- 
formulas which are not preserved under equivalence, can be imposed. 
There is no such level as 'Logical Form' in Montague Grammar. This is 
formulated explicitly in the following extension of the CP: 
(i) 
(ii) 
Extended Compositionality Principle (ECP): 
CP: as above. 
for any condition c on outputs T(e~ . . . . .  e,) of translation 
rules, and any model M for IL: if el is equivalent to ~/i in 
M(i= 1 . . . . .  n), then if T(E~ . . . . .  e,) satisfies c, so does 
T(Vl,. • •, 3~n). 
It follows from the ECP that there is no formula e satisfying the 
following condition on the output of T, e = T (~, . . . ,  en): 'e must be the 
one and only natural translation (or the logical form) of the syntactic 
expression', since this condit ion- in its intended meaning (see for 
example Keenan and Faltz (1978))- is not preserved under equivalence. 
For example, the two translations (xP((hQVx(Qx-) Px)) (man'))) (walk') 
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and Vx(man'(x)~walk'(x)) of the sentence very man walks cannot 
be distinguished in the grammar, since they refer to the same meaning. 
Compositionality is incompatible with such a notion of 'naturalness of
the translation'. 
Another consequence of the compositionality principle is the dis- 
tinction between the structure and the derivation of sentences. As 
pointed out at the beginning of this section, semantics has to deal with 
entailment relations, and hence it has to account for scope ambiguities. 
Scope ambiguities make it necessary to associate distinct meanings with 
a sentence (or a structure). The compositionality principle then implies 
that, if arguments can be given that the ambiguity is neither structural 
nor lexical, one can only obtain these different readings through a 
derivational ambiguity. In other words, we have to associate different 
derivations with such ambiguous sentences. Thus, an essential feature of 
a compositional theory is the distinction between derivation-trees and 
structure-trees (cf. Janssen (1978)). For example,'there are independent 
reasons for assigning one structure to the sentence veryone in this room 
knows one language (that is, the ambiguity is not structural). The 
different readings cannot originate from different intensions of the parts, 
since both readings should be produced from the same parts (the 
ambiguity is not lexical). So, by compositionality, we can only dis- 
tinguish its two meanings if we derive them differently. 
A common argument against his view on scope ambiguities i  that 
semantic theory need not associate two readings with such a sentence. It
would suffice to produce only one reading (with everyone having wide 
scope over one language), and state (pragmatic) conditions under which 
the interpretation of this sentence is narrowed down to the other 
reading, which entails the generated one. However, this does not work in 
cases where the different readings are logically independent. We will 
come back to this at the end of Section 2. 
As has already been mentioned, another consequence of the com- 
positionality principle is the lack of a level of 'Logical Form'. This has 
important consequences for the analysis of anaphora in Montague 
Grammar. These consequences will be extensively discussed in the next 
section. 
First, however, we need to be more explicit about the relation be- 
tween the compositionality principle, and the organization of the gram- 
mar in general. At the beginning of this section it was pointed out that 
the strength of the compositionality principle depends heavily on what 
other restrictions we impose on the form of grammatical rules. A place 
in the grammar where this becomes crucial is at the point where 
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morphology fits into syntax: in morphological features. Let us digress 
briefly to explain this in more detail. We take such features to have a 
strictly morphological function: they are to serve as inputs for mor- 
phological operations mapping completed labelled bracketings onto final 
forms ('surface structures', phonological representations', etc.). But 
even if such features are meant to be morphological, there are many 
syntactic (or semantic) functions they can perform. For example, if it is 
possible to mention features in the input of syntactic rules, we can 
encode rule ordering in features (derivational history). Further, features 
could be used to arbitrarily filter out structures at the level of syntax; 
and if we do not forbid the encoding of arbitrary information about 
aspects of derivational history in features, Partee's constraint "do not 
refer to arbitrary aspects of derivational history" (Partee (197%), 
(1979b)), clearly loses its meaning. This, in turn, affects the com- 
positionality principle. For the essential part of the CP says that we have 
to operate with logical formulas (translations) as if we are operating 
with meanings; in particular, semantic operations on meanings hould 
not depend on the way these translations are derived. Thus, we have to 
restrict he role played by features. It goes beyond the scope of this 
paper to present a theory of features that achieves this. Such a theory is 
proposed in Landman and Moerdijk (1982). 
We now state some minimal assumptions about he form of the rules. 
It is not our aim to present a full formal description of the grammar; we 
only outline a minimal framework in which we can formulate our own 
proposals concerning the analysis of anaphora (Section 2), and in which 
the CP does not lose its strength (thus, although we do not discuss 
features we do have to restrict he relation between syntax and mor- 
phology). 
Following Partee (1979a), we take a rule R of the grammar to have the 
form 
R = (FR, GR, SAR), 
where FR is a syntactic operation, GR is a semantic operation, and SAR 
is a structural analysis. R applied to lb's f f l  . . . . .  O~ n of specific cate- 
gories, translating into a~ . . . . .  a" respectively, yields a complex lb 
Fe(Otl . . . . .  an) of some specified category with translation 
GR(a~ . . . . .  a~, only if (al . . . . .  an) satisfies SAR. If one wants a theory 
of grammar of this form to be explanatorily adequate in any sense of the 
word, it has to be clarified 
(i) what forms the Fn-rules can take, 
(ii) what forms the GR-rules can take, 
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(iii) 
(iv) 
what properties (of lb's) the SAR's can express, 
given R, what the relation between FR, GR and SAR is. 
Note that the answers to these questions cannot be independent of each 
other. Until now, we have only adopted the category-type agreement of 
PTQ and the ECP. Some further answers to these questions are dis- 
cussed in Partee (1979a) and Partee (1979b). In this paper, we will only 
use two kinds of basic syntactic operations; concatenation to build up 
structure, and substitution which preserves tructure. 
A concatenation rule is a rule which has as input categories a 'function 
category' a//3 and an 'argument category' /3, and as output category the 
'value category' a. A concatenation rule transforms labelled bracketings 
[~]~/~ and [~]~ into a more complex labelled bracketing [[~]~/~[~]~]~. 
A substitution rule substitutes an lb [~]~ for some (k-)indexed sub lb's 
[~k]l~ . . . . .  [~k]2 in an lb [... [~k]~... [~/k]2...]8- The result of substitut- 
ing [~]~ for [~k]~ in this lb depends of course on the particular ule used. 
We do not go into the problem of what possible forms these results can 
take here. 
Note that this set of possible types of rules only admits rules in which 
either the output category is one of the input categories (substitution), or 
it is the 'multiplication' of the input categories (concatenation). 
Concerning the second question (what forms the GR's can take) and 
part of the fourth (the relation between the FR-operations and the 
corresponding Gg's) we will assume the following: if FR is a con- 
catenation rule, then GR is the operation of functional application (cf. 
Partee (1979a)). Thus if [~]~/~ translates into ~' and [~]~ translates into ~', 
then FR([~]~/~,[~]~)=[[~]~/~[~]~]~ translates into ~'(^~'). To state the 
translation rules corresponding to substitution, we take indexed expres- 
sions to translate into expressions containing only variables and logical 
operators (and in particular a free variable with the same index as the 
indexed expression), which seems reasonable (cf. Janssen (1979), Partee 
(1979b)). If FR is a substitution rule substituting an lb [~]~ for an indexed lb 
[~k]~ in [4~]~, and [~]~ translates into ~', [~b]~ into 6', and [~k]~ translates 
into an IL-formula r/~ which contains an indexed variable xk, then the 
result of applying FR has as translation ~'(^hXk~b') 1. 
In this way, for the types of grammatical rules used in this paper we 
have severely restricted the semantic operations; and these semantic 
operations all satisfy the compositionality principle. In line with the 
remarks about features made above, it is plausible to require that 
conditions on application of syntactic rules (SAR'S) are purely structural, 
and cannot ask for the (non-)occurrence of certain features. They can 
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only refer to (sub)category labels, occurrences of indexed pronouns 2,
and 'tree-structure properties'. These tree-structure properties are stated 
in a tree-language (or equivalently an lb-language), so that we may define 
familiar structural notions from Transformational Grammar. Examples 
will be given in Section 2.3. The effects that such restrictions on the 
form of the SAR's have on the analysis of anaphora will be discussed in 
the next section. 
2. THE ANALYS IS  OF  ANAPHORA 
2.1. Logical Form 
Let us briefly consider the question whether Montague Grammar can 
adopt the methods of (recent versions, cf. Chomsky (1980), (1981) of) 
Transformational Grammar used for the analysis of coreference. In 
Transformational Grammar, an intermediate l vel of Logical Form (LF) 
is placed between the level of syntax (S-structures or surface structures) 
and that of semantics, at which coreference-structure and scope-rela- 
tions are determined. At this level, syntactic structures, or rather their 
'logical forms' appear, enriched with indices, variables, and quantifiers, 
which disambiguate the original syntactic structures (i.e., one structure 
is possibly mapped onto more than one logical form). In this respect he 
level of LF can be compared with the level of the logical language IL in 
Montague Grammar. Structural conditions referring to such indices, 
variables, and quantifiers appearing at LF are then used to filter out 
logical forms which are not 'wellformed', and through this mechanism 
overgeneration of sentences showing an ungrammatical anaphoric 
structure is blocked. Familiar examples of such conditions are the 
Propositional Island Condition, the Nominative Island Condition, and 
the Opacity Condition from Chomsky (1980), or the 'Pisa-axioms', cf. 
Chomsky (1981). 
Now can such conditions be used in Montague Grammar? First recall 
that in Montague Grammar syntactic structures are derived with a 
certain meaning; the derivation tree can be considered as the disam- 
biguated structure which is translated into IL, and model-theoretically 
interpreted. But the compositionality principle tells us that the IL- 
translation is nothing but a means to refer to an intension, and this 
implies that it is impossible to lay conditions on IL-expressions referring 
to the position of indexed variables, etc., in order to filter out certain 
expressions as 'incorrect ranslations': only conditions that are preser- 
ved under logical equivalence are allowed at this level. 
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Thus, we must conclude that such 'logical form methods' are inap- 
plicable in Montague Grammar. In Section 2.3., we will take an approach 
which is more akin to earlier methods of Transformational Grammar, 
which used conditions on application of (structure-preserving) trans- 
formations, cf. Chomsky (1973), (1975). In fact, we will give an analysis 
of anaphora t a purely syntactic level, using conditions on application 
of substitution rules. (Such rules may be seen to correspond to the 
structure preserving transformations of TG, cf. Landman and Moerdijk 
(1981).) 
2.2. Compositionality and the Wellformedness Constraint 
In this section we will concentrate on the interaction of compositionality 
and a strong version of Partee's wellformedness constraint (Partee 
(1979b)), which we formulate as: 
do not use syntactic expressions in the derivation of a sen- 
tence that are not constituent parts of wellformed surface 
expressions. 
There is a growing list of articles (Cooper (1975), (1979); Engdahl (1980); 
Gazdar and Sag (1981); Bach and Partee (1981); Partee and Bach (1981), 
etc.) that contain analyses of anaphora that try to obey both com- 
positionality and wellformedness, and consequently forbid the use of 
indexed variables (he0, he1,...) in the derivation of sentences containing 
anaphora. Our discussion of such proposals will be based on the gram- 
mar presented in Bach and Partee (1981); Partee and Bach (1981), since 
these papers seem to contain the most detailed analyses. (Henceforth, 
these two papers will be collectively referred to as BP.) We will argue 
that this form of the wellformedness constraint is not compatible with 
the compositionality principle as formalized in Section 1 (and neither 
with limited relaxations of this formulation of compositionality). In the 
next Subsection 2.3. we will discuss the effects of a relaxation of the 
wellformedness constraint which does allow for indexed pronouns in the 
syntax. 
Compositional theories of anaphora which obey the wellformedness 
constraint should show how sentences (1) and (4) with their respective 
meanings (2) and (5) can be derived in a compositional way, without 
making use of structures of the forms (3) and (6). 
(1) John hates himself. 
(2) hate,(j, j) 
(3) he. hates hen 
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(4) John says that Mary hates him 
(5) say,(j, ^ hate~,(m, j))
(6) hen says that Mary hates himn 
We will discuss the grammar of BP by using these examples. The 
underlying framework of BP can best be introduced by means of the 
following quotation (Partee and Bach (1981), p. 447): 
(i) We assume Montague's general theory (Montague, 1970b, UG) especially 
with respect o compositionality, except as modified by Cooper (1975) to 
permit he direct assignment of sets of interpretations to ambiguous sen- 
tences without a level of a disambiguated language, including Cooper's 
'storage' device (which amounts to a limited relaxation of the com- 
positionality requirement). 
(ii) We assume the wellformedness constraint of Partee (1979b), strengthened to 
exclude indexed forms like he0, he~ .... from the syntax. 
(iii) The syntax is limited to a rich context-free language (...). 
(iv) The semantics i a direct modeltheoretic interpretation f the syntax; an 
intermediate level of translation i to intensional logic is dispensable (...). 
Simplifying somewhat, their grammar may be said to generate four- 
tuples, consisting of a syntactic structure, its IL-translation, and two 
sets: the quantifier store (QST) and the local pronoun store (LPST). We 
will not discuss storage-mechanisms here; for this, the reader is referred 
to Cooper (1975), Ladusaw (1980), Engdahl (1980). Let us turn to 
examples (1) and (3) as analyzed in the grammar of BP. In the lexicon, 
we find entries like 
(7) (John, hPP{^j}, ~b, &) 
(QST and LPST are empty) 
(8) (he, hPP{xi}, ~b, {i}) 
(LPST contains index i, i a natural number) 
(9) (himself,)tPP{x~}, {(self, i)}, {i}) 
(where (self, i )= QtRx[R(x)(^)~PP{xi})], i , so both QST and 
LPST are nonempty; self has type (r(IV), r(IV)) 
Note that (8) and (9) are 'schemas' for lexical entries; for every index i 
there are entries (8~) and (9i). 
(10) (hate, hate', 6, 6) 
The rules of NP-storage and quantification are: 
(11) STORE T: (T, T', &, 6) ~ (T, XPP{x,}, {(T', i)}, {i})3 
(12) QUAN T: (t, t', {(T', i)}, {i}) ~ (t, T'(^~xf), &, 4~) 
Further, there is a rule mapping intransitive verbphrases containing a 
stored reflexive (i.e. QST contains stored parts of the meaning of 
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himself) onto intransitive verbphrases having this stored part quantified, 
as in (13). 
(13) REFL: (hate himself, hate'(^APP{xi}), {(self, i)}, {i}) 
(hate himself, hPP{self(^Axi hate'(^APP{xi}))}, ~b, ~b) 
(this reduces to 
(hate himself, hxi hate'(^ APP {xi})(^ hPP {xi}), <b, ~p ).) 
Concatenation of a transitive verbphrase and a term yields an intran- 
sitive verbphrase (and takes the union of stores): 
(14) (hate, hate', ~b, d~) + (John, APP{^j}, d), &) 
(hate John, hate'(^hPP{^j}), ~b q~); 
(hate, hate', &, ~b) + (he, hPP{xi), ~b, {i}) 
(hate him, hate'(^APP{xi}), ~b, {i}). 
It is in the rule for T + IV ~ t that the differences between reflexives 
and ordinary pronouns are expressed: 
(15) (T, T', Q1, P1) + (IV, IV', Q2, P:) 
(T'IV, IV'(^T'), QI u Q2, P3) 
where P3 is the set of indices i E P1 U P2 such that Q1 or Q2 
contains a term meaning stored with index i. (So P3 does not 
contain index i if Q1 or Q2 only contains (self, i)). 
Condition: P1 A Pz = 4~, the LPST of the subject does not 
share indices with the LPST of the verb. 
Final sentences have empty quantifier stores. 
For example, sentence (1) (with meaning (2)) is derived by first 
(1) John hates himseff 
applying the rule underlying (14) to (10) and (9) (TV + T ~ IV), and then 
applying (13) to the result (IV ~ IVre~.), and finally applying (15) to (7) 
and the result of applying (13) (T + IVre~. ~ t). Sentence (16) cannot be 
derived. 
(16) *John says that Mary hates himself. 
The only way to get himself coreferential with John and not with Mary is 
by not applying REFL to hate himseff (since this would bind himself to 
Mary in the next step), but instead trying to build up (17). 
(17) (say that Mary hates himself, say'(^hate(m, Vx~)), {(self, i)}, {i}). 
But the rule that builds up this IV involves an application of (15) to 
(Mary, APP{^m}, d~, ~b) and (hate himself, hate'(^)~PP{xi}), {(self, i)},{i}) 
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and this rule deletes the index i from LPST (because QST only contains 
(self, i)). Therefore, not (17) is produced, but (17'): 
(17') (say that Mary hates himself, say'(^hate(m, Vxi)), {(self, i)}, 4)) 
where LPST no longer contains index i, and (self, i) cannot be quantified 
in, but is doomed to stay in LPST. 
The condition on rule (15) blocks the derivation of (18). The bound 
(18) John hates him 
reading can only be obtained by using a stored John, 
(19) (John,)tPP{x~}, {()~PP{^j}, i)}, {i}) 
and the result of applying (15) to (10) and (8): 
(20) (hate him, hate'(^)~ee{x,}), qb, {i}) 
But then the derivation is blocked, since both local pronoun stores 
contain index i. Indices of reflexives and pronouns are deleted from 
LPST at t-level; consequently, the condition that blocked derivation of 
(18) does not block derivation of (4), 
(4) John says that Mary hates him 
In Bach and Partee (1981) it is shown that this grammar makes almost 
the same predictions as Reinhart's non-c-command condition (Reinhart 
(1979)) but combines this with PTQ's predictions on scope-ambiguities. 
This is of course a result of considerable importance. There are some 
difficulties, however, with their grammar as well as with the underlying 
framework, which seem inherent o their proposal. 
Starting with an empirical problem: the aim of their grammar is to give 
a semantic haracterization of the possible relations between an ante- 
cedent and an anaphor (in terms of function-argument-structure, instead 
of by 'tree properties' of syntactic structures). Consequently, what the 
antecedent of an anaphor is is not expressed in the syntax, nor is it 
detectable through an antecedent-seeking rule (like REFL). This in turn 
implies that all properties hared by antecedent and anaphor should be 
essentially semantic properties (properties which can be expressed in 
modeltheoretic terms). It has been claimed (Cooper (1975)) that this is 
indeed the case in English: antecedent and anaphor have the same 
gender and number, and these are properties of the referents (gender is 
natural gender). In German, however, gender agreement between an 
antecedent and its anaphor involves grammatical gender: (21) shows 
grammatical gender-agreement, and (22) natural gender-agreement. 
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(21) Der Liigendetektor sagt dem Miidchen dass 
The-Masc liedetector tells the-Neut girl that 
es ihn betriigt. 
she-Neat it-Masc cheats. 
(22) *Der Liigendetektor sagt dem Miidchen dass 
The-Masc liedetector tells the-Neut girl that 
sie es betriigt. 
she-Fern it-Neat cheats. 
Since German and English show roughly the same restrictions on 
possible anaphoric relations, these should be dealt with at the same 
level. If this level is the semantics, it seems to be necessary for the 
correct description of German pronoun distribution to claim that indivi- 
duals (in the model) not only have properties like 'being male', but also 
like 'being denoted by a word with neuter grammatical gender' (as the 
word M~idehen 'girl' illustrates). This does not seem reasonable. 
Let us now turn to BP's framework principles (i)-(iv). Before com- 
menting on part (i), it is perhaps useful to be slightly more explicit about 
'weak compositionality' in Cooper's sense. First recall that Montague 
generated a sentence with two non-equivalent readings by giving two 
derivations for this sentence (i.e., by associating two derivation trees 
with it at the level of the disambiguated language); every syntactic 
expression has an intension, and with every syntactic operation there is 
a semantic operation mapping the intensions of the input expressions 
onto the intension of the output expression. Compositionality restricts 
the class of possible semantic operations. An essential property of 
compositional semantics is the dispensability of the logical language 
(which should not be confused with the (non)dispensability of the 
'disambiguated language', the level of derivation trees, cf. Section 1). In 
Cooper (1975) a grammar is presented which deals with ambiguities 
without a level of derivation trees (but with storage mechanisms). With 
each syntactic expression a set of intensions is associated (in case of a 
non-ambiguous expression, a singleton-set); and even if only non-am- 
biguous lexical expressions are used in a derivation, it should be possible 
to end up with an ambiguous complex expression (scope ambiguities). 
Therefore, for each syntactic operation there is a corresponding set of 
semantic operations. Weak compositionality-according to Cooper-  
now means that if one knows the intension of the parts of a complex 
expression, and one knows how to build up this complex expression, 
then one knows a set of intensions one of which is the actual intension. 
The status of weak compositionality is somewhat less clear than that 
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of compositionality, due to the fact that it is not clear what kinds of 
semantic operations may be used. Without being more explicit about 
this, weak compositionality seems to be a very weak restriction indeed. 
Strictly speaking, however, weak compositionality is not satisfied by 
BP's grammar. For an essential feature of weak compositionality as
formulated above is that stores of final sentences and of basic expres- 
sions are empty. (If not, the set of intensions of a complex expression is
not solely determined by the intensions of the parts and the rules used, 
but also by something else hidden in the stores.) But the lexical entries 
of he and himself ((8) and (9) above) have non-empty stores (the store of 
himself even contains the essential part of the meaning of himself). 
There is a related but more fundamental problem having to do with 
the dispensability of the logical language (claim (iv), p. 98). BP classify 
LPST as something in between a syntactic and a semantic mechanism. 
This somewhat misleadingly suggests that LPST is (part of) a new 
component of the grammar. But in fact, what LPST comes down to is a 
device for storing indices of variables occurring in the IL-translation of 
expressions. This however, amounts to saying that LPST is equivalent 
to a mechanism describing properties of IL-translations. The functioning 
of mechanisms like LPST may be described as: 
(1) With every basic expression a property of its IL-translation is 
associated. 
(2) Corresponding to syntactic rules operations on properties of IL- 
translations of the inputs are defined. 
(3) These operations are partial operations: there are conditions on the 
application of rules stated in terms of properties of IL-translations. 
These indices of variables do not exist in the syntax (wellformedness), 
nor in the semantics (modeltheoretic interpretation), but only at the level 
of IL. The properties of IL-expressions do not correspond to properties 
of intensions. But this means that claim (iv) is false-essential use is 
made of the level of IL-formulas. Thus, the logical language is not 
dispensable and hence the grammar cannot be said to be compositional 
(either in the strong, or in the weak sense). 
At a formal level, there are several ways to avoid these difficulties. 
One is to enrich the indices that form the domain of intensions; thus, 
intensions are now functions from I x J x G x H to extensions, where H is 
some set of 'pronoun domains' to be defined, and G is the set of 
variable-assignments. (This solution is hinted at in Groenendijk and 
Stokhof (1979).) Another is not to take intensions (functions from 
indices to extensions) as meanings, but something with more structure 
instead. For example, we could take as meanings not intensions, but 
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pairs consisting of an intension and a (set of) natural number(s): a 
variable xi then has the meaning (the intension of xi, i). Indices now 
appear as 'real objects' in the model, and the level of IL is again 
dispensable. 
It seems doubtful, however, whether this would give a natural way of 
expressing modeltheoretically what LPST does. (Perhaps a change from 
intensions to really structured meanings can provide this; but that 
requires fundamental changes in the logic, a discussion of which would 
lead us too far, here.) And even if an enrichment of meanings with 
indices along these lines would suffice, this still results in a concept of 
meaning which lacks the intuitive elegance and motivation that the 
concept of intension has, and it implies the introduction of 'abstract 
markers' in the semantics. Thus, violation of wellformedness is trans- 
posed from the syntax to the semantics, in which 'indexed pronouns' 
now appear as objects in the model! 
Therefore, we may conclude that the strengthening of the wellfor- 
medness constraint (no indexed pronouns in the syntax) has con- 
sequences which reach much further than just a mild relaxation of 
cornpositionality 4. These consequences are avoided in a framework with 
a weaker form of wellformedness ( o as to admit indexed pronouns in 
the syntax). In such a framework, the compositionality principle can 
be maintained in its strongest form; there are no semantic onditions on 
applications of rules, and instead of introducing structur4~l meanings, the 
structured syntax (labelled bracketings, which we have anyway) is 
exploited in analyzing anaphoric relations. We now turn to this. 
2.3. Anaphoric Relations in Syntax 
In the previous section we discussed theories that do not allow for 
indexed pronouns in the syntax, and the problems with the principle of 
compositionality hat this gives rise to. We will now consider an ap- 
proach to anaphora in a framework in which wellformedness is slightly 
relaxed, in favor of the compositionality principle. The lexicon now 
contains indexed pronouns, i.e. indexed basic expressions PRO1, 
PRO2 . . . .  of category T, with translations )~PP{xl}, )tPP{x2} . . . . .  The 
grammar contains a rule which links occurrences of indexed pronouns as 
anaphors to other expressions. This rule will have the form of a 
substitution rule. 
Let us once more stress that it is not our aim to give new explanations 
of facts. On the contrary, the rules and conditions that will be for- 
mulated are all (minor modifications of) wellknown analyses of 
anaphora. It is our purpose to see what form these rules and conditions 
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can take, given a compositional framework as sketched earlier. As a 
starting point, we take Montague's rule from PTQ, which can be 
formulated as (1) below. Later on, we will consider several 
modifications. 
(1) if a is an expression of category T and 49 is an expression of 
category t, then Sn(a, 49) is an expression of category t,where 
Sn(a, 49) is defined as follows: 
(i) if a is not some PROk, replace the first occurrence of PRO. in 
49 by a, and all other occurrences of PRO. in 49 by PRO, with 
appropriate case, number, gender, and person (in accordance 
with ~). 
(ii) if a is PROk, replace all occurrences of PRO, in 49 by PROk 
with appropriate case. 
For example, S3(the man, PRO3 says that Mary loves PRO3)= tile man 
says that Mary loves him, and Ss(John, PRO5 loves PROs)= John loves 
him. The translation rule corresponding to S, translates S,(a, 49) into 
a'(hx,49'), where a' and 49' are the translations of a and 49. It is possible 
to generate one sentence with several nonequivalent translations, for 
example in order to treat scope ambiguities. 
As has often been observed, this rule (1) has some obvious shortcom- 
ings. As the example shows, the rule does not handle reflexives. Also, 
the rule subst{tutes the antecedent for the first occurrence of the 
pronoun with the relevant index, which does not always yield correct 
results. And it is obvious that the morphological properties dealt with in 
the rule should be formulated much more systematically and explicitly. 
The phrase 'with appropriate case, gender, number and person' should 
be replaced by explicit operations on features. It is, however, im- 
mediately clear that this rule can in principle deal with any kind of 
agreement of syntactic and morphological properties of antecedent and 
anaphor, since these are linked at a syntactic level. Thus, the problems 
with grammatical gender discussed in the preceding section are avoided. 
Let us first consider eflexivization. One of the first modifications of 
Montague's rule which treats reflexives by means of indexed pronouns is 
Michael Bennett's. Slightly simplified, his proposal (Bennett (1975)) for 
analyzing reflexives can be described as follows. His grammar produces 
strings (as in PTQ) instead of labelled bracketings, and the rules for 
reflexivization use a syntactic marker, the so-called 'Bennett-star'. This 
is a marker that is introduced at some level in the derivation and (if 
necessary) deleted at another level. Its function is to fulfil some of the 
tasks of structural conditions in a grammar that cannot explicitly refer to 
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structures (since it produces trings instead of labelled bracketings). The 
syntactic marker represents a certain syntactic property that a string 
has, during that part of the derivation at which the marker is present. 
Bennett's rule TV + T ~ IV introduces a star, in case the termphrase is 
an indexed pronoun. For example, love+he. ~love *him.. The rule 
T + IV ~ t then takes care of reflexivization as is shown by the follow- 
ing paraphrase: 
(A)(1) if the termphrase is he, and the IV contains *himn then *him, 
is changed to *himself,. 
(2) if the termphrase is not he, or the IV does not contain *him, 
then the rule simply concatenates T and IV. 
(B) after this, the stars are deleted. 
Thus an IV which contains a star has the syntactic property that there is 
an occurrence of a pronoun in it which is 'close' enough to become 
reflexivized if the string is combined with a pronoun with the same index. 
At t-level all stars are deleted. Although say that Mary loves him, 
contains an occurrence of an indexed pronoun, this occurrence is too 
'far' for reflexivization. I f  a simple IV like love *him, is combined with a 
subject termphrase like Mary, the resulting phrase no longer has the 
syntactic property represented by the star, hence the star is deleted, and 
consequently the complex IV say that Mary loves him, does not have 
this property either. Finally, the substitution rule can substitute John for 
he, in hen hates himself~ and hen says that Mary hates himn which gives 
(2) and (3). 
(2) John hates himself 
(3) John says that Mary hates him 
As mentioned above, devices like the Bennett star may be replaced by 
syntactic onditions in a grammar which produces labelled bracketings 
instead of strings. An advantage of such a replacement lies in the fact 
that the star itself tells us only very indirectly which aspects of the 
syntactic onfiguration (except he presence of the star itself) make up 
the difference between a reflexive and an ordinary pronoun. If we define 
a syntactic property equivalent to the star, we are forced to make a 
decision about this difference, i.e., we have to give an explicit descrip- 
tion of the structural properties determining the choice between a 
reflexive or a pronoun. We will give a formulation of Bennett's rules 
with a simple syntactic ondition below. The use of structure in the 
syntax makes syntactic markers dispensable, which is a desirable con- 
sequence in itself, because of the effects markers can have on the 
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expressive power of the grammar (for example, using markers it is easy 
to create rule ordering, cf. Landman and Moerdijk (1981)). Let us 
replace Bennett's tar by a structural condition: 
DEFINITION. Let ,/ by an IV-node, and let a be a node properly 
dominated by ,/5. We say that a is close in `/ iff there is no t-node 
properly dominated by % which properly dominates a. If a is not close 
in ` /, we will say that a is far  in `/. 
We can now replace Bennett's rule TV + T ~ IV by ordinary con- 
catenation, [a]a-v + [/3]7 ~ [[a]rv[13]r]Iv, while his T + IV ~ t will now 
be as follows. 
Given [a]T and [13]iv, let ` /be the top-IV node of [/3]rv; then 
[OL]T -I- [/3]IV ~ [[a]T[/3']IV]t, where 
(1) if a # hek (for some k), then 13' =/3, 
(2) if a = hek, then /3' comes from 13 by replacing each occur- 
rence of himk that is close in ` /by hlmselfk. 
TV + T ~ IV will produce [[loVe]Tv[himk]T]tV, in which himk is close in 
the IV-node. So if this structure is combined with [hek]T, himk will be 
reflexivized. On the other hand, if [hek]r is combined with [say that 
[Mary loves him~]t]iv, then himk will not be reflexivized since it is far in 
the top IV-node. 
If we compare these rules with Bennett's original formulation, we 
observe that the new rules are considerably simpler, and that the 
difference between a reflexive and an ordinary pronoun is expressed 
more directly in the grammar. A reflexive and its antecedent occur at the 
same syntactic level (within a t-clause), while an ordinary pronoun and 
its antecedent occur at different syntactic levels. If we compare this 
result with BP, we find that the solution just presented mirrors their 
solution, which tries to distinguish different semantic levels at which 
antecedent and anaphor can occur. One of the advantages of the 
syntactic approach is that there are independent (although not totally 
theory-free) criteria for determining syntactic structure (the so-called 
structuralist tests). Another is the syntactic boundary nature of the 
category t. Such structure does not exist in the models of intensional 
logic. 
At the empirical level, a difference between our modification of 
Bennett's grammar and the grammar of BP is that the latter incor- 
porates, at the level of LPST, a version of Reinhart (1979)'s c-command 
condition and our grammar does not. C-command is a structural notion, 
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defined as follows: 
c-commands /3 iff a does not dominate /3, /3 does not 
dominate a, and the first branching node dominating a also 
dominates/3. 
Sentences (4)-(8) admit coreferential readings in just those cases where 
no anaphor c-commands its antecedent. 
(4) *he hates John 
(5) John says that he is ill 
(6) *he says that John is ill 
(7) when John is ill, he goes to the doctor 
(8) when he is ill, John goes to the doctor 
In order to incorporate this in the grammar, we introduce the following 
notion: 
(9) A possible n-antecedent in an lb ~b is an occurrence of PROn 
in ~b which is not c-commanded by any other occurrence of 
PROn in ~b. 6
Using this notion, we define a new substitution rule ANAa for anaphoric 
relations (and scope-ambiguities): 
(10) ANAn (first version): If ~b is an lb of category t and ~ is a 
termphrase, and a is a possible n-antecedent in ~, then 
ANAn,~(~, ~) is again of category t, where ANAn,~(~b, ~) 
comes from ~b by replacing a by ~ and every other occur- 
rence of PRO~ (or PROselfn) in ~b by PRO (or PROself). 
Condition: ~ = PROk if[ k = n. 
Together with other rules, this rule makes roughly the correct predic- 
tions concerning reflexivization, and it can now deal with sentences 
(4)-(8). (4) cannot be derived, since it could only be derived from (11), 
which itself cannot be derived because the second occurrence of PROn 
is close in hate PRO~ and is reflexivized when this IV is combined with 
subject PROn. In (12) John can only be substituted for a (/3 is c- 
commanded by a). 
(11) *PROn hates PROn 
(12) PROn hates PROselfn 
In (13), both a and/3 are possible n-antecedents. Application of ANA~,~ 
to (John, (13)) yields (7), and application of ANAn,, to (John, (13)) yields 
(8). 
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(13) When PRO. is ill, PRO. goes to the doctor 
a /3 
Note that the distinction between reflexives and ordinary pronouns is 
formalized by complicating the rule T + IV ~ t. It would be in line with 
the considerations of the first section, however, to express the charac- 
terizing properties of antecedent-anaphor relations as conditions on 
application of the rule that links anaphors and antecedent. We therefore 
drop the notions close and far, return to the ordinary concatenation rule 
[O~]T ~ [/3]IV ~ [[OL]T [/3]IV]t 
(consequently, there are no special concatenation rules, with conditions 
on their application) and reformulate the anaphoric rule ANA. by using 
the notion bound and free (familiar from TG). For occurrences (~ and/3 
of an indexed pronoun PRO. we define: 
(14) a is bound by [3 in (a node) 3  `iff/3 c-commands a, and there 
is no t-node 8 dominated by 3  `such that 3 properly domi- 
nates a, but not/3 (and 3  `dominates a and/3). 
a is bound in 3  `iff there is an occurrence/3 of PRO. in 3  `such 
that a is bound by/3 in 3 .` 
a is free for [3 in 3  `iff a is not bound by/3 in 3 .` 
a is free in 3' iff a is not bound in 3/- 
To given an example, in (15) 7 is bound by/3, because/3 c-commands 3'
and every t-node dominating 3  `also dominates/3. 
(15) [PRO. says that [PRO. hates PRO.],], 
a /3 3' 
On the other hand, though a c-commands both/3 and % there is a t-node 
dominating/3 and 3/but not dominating a, thus both/3 and 3  `are free for 
(16) ANA.  (second version): If ~b is an lb of category t and ~ is a 
termphrase, and a is a possible n-antecedent in ~b, then 
ANA.,~(~b, ~) is again an lb of category t, where ANA.,~(th, ~) 
comes from ~b by replacing a by ~, and replacing every other 
occurrence of PROn in ~b by PROself if it is bound in ~b, and 
by PRO otherwise. Further, if ~b translates into qS', ~ into ~', 
then ANA.,~(~b, ~) translates into ~'(^)tx.4/). 
Condition: ~ = PROk if k = n. 
The condition guarantees a 'faithfulness'-property of the rule ANA.: 
it cannot change the coreference relations as expressed by the indices of 
the input, it can only convert coreference into 'real' anaphoric struc- 
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tures. Without he condition we could, for example, derive (I8) from (17) 
by applying ANAn,~(PROr,, (17)). 
(17) PROn said that PRO," liked PROn 
c~ f3 ~/ 
(18) PRO,, said that PRO," liked PRO 
~3 
In (18), ~ is a possible m-antecedent, so we can apply ANA,~ and substitute 
Mary for a; this yields 
(19) *Mary said that she liked her 
(20) said~(m, ^ liked,(m, m)) 
Thus, without the condition, the antecedent Mary in (20) acts twice as 
binding an anaphor which is too far from this antecedent to be 
reflexivized. 
Let us briefly indicate how morphological operations, for example 
gender agreement, can be incorporated in this rule. For definitions and 
motivation of the concepts involved we refer to Landman and Moerdijk 
(1981), (1982). 
The grammar now produces labelled bracketings of the form [O~]c,: 
where a is either a lexical string or itself a labelled bracketing, C is a 
category label, and f is a sequence of sets of features and of variables. 
Some features, like those for gender, number, and person are thought to 
be lexical, others, like features for case and morphological character 
(pronominal or reflexive) are structural. This is expressed in the gram- 
mar by generating basic expressions (members of the lexicon) with a 
feature sequence that contains the relevant lexical features, and has 
variables for the structural features. Thus the lexicon contains entries 
like: 
[man] CN, ({masc}, {singular}, Xcase ) 
[o ld ]cN/CN,  ({ . . . .  }, {singular} . . . . . .  ) 
[oId]cN/cN, <{,"asc}, {plural}, Xcase ) 
Syntactic rules can perform certain operations on feature sequences, 
most importantly, agreement: ake the union of the relevant feature sets 
of the inputs; and assignment: substitute, relative to an assignment 
property of one of the input expressions, a feature set for all the 
relevant variables in the other input expression. An example of 
agreement is:
[oId]cN/cN, <.. {~inga~ar}..> + [man]oN, <.. {si.g.l~r}..> ::)' 
[[old] [man]]cN, <.. {s[ngular}U{singular}..) 
( = [[old][man]]cN, <.. {singula,}..>) 
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Assignment is shown in the following example: 
[with] PP/T,+dative + [the<.. ~caso..>man(.. x~a,o..>] ( ....... ..> 
[[with] [the<.. {doti~e}..>man<.. {aati~e}..>]<.. {dative}..>] 
In the morphological component structures with feature sequences are 
mapped onto morphologically expanded forms. Morphological rules 
cannot expand a structure if it has an ambiguous morphological in- 
struction. Such structures are ruled out. In this way feature agreement is
dealt with in the morphological component: concatenation of old and 
man can only result in an expanded form if they have the same lexical 
features. If [o ld ] ( .  . {singular}. .) is concatenated with [man]<..{plural}..>, the resul- 
ting structure, [[old][man]]<.. {singular, plural}..> has an ambiguous morphological 
instruction and is ruled out. 
Indexed pronouns are also base generated with lexical features and 
variables for case and pronomial character. Thus the lexicon contains 
entries like: 
[PRO7]  T, {{masc}, {plural}, {3rd person}, x..... Xpron-char) 
[PRO7] r, ({neut}, {singular}, {3rd person}, xc . . . . .  pron-char) 
As part of a sentential structure all case variables are replaced by case 
feature sets. 
Given this, we can reformulate ANAn(ignoring inessential details): 
(21) ANAn 
Let [~:]r,<s~o~ r . . . .  fpers fpr0n-char) be an lb of category T, [~b]t an lb 
of category t, a a possible n-antecedent in qS, 
a = [PRO,,] r, {ggen, g . . . .  g ..... pron-char)" 
Then ANAn,~(~, 4))= [~b']t, where ~b' comes from q5 by 
replacing ~ by [~] r,C:~onUggon, Sn~mUg .... ipor~Ugpo~, fpron-ehar} .(SO the lexical 
features of a and ~ are united and fpron-char is substituted for 
Xpron-char) 
and replacing every other occurrence/3 of PROn, 
/3 = [PROn] T, <hgen , hnum, hp . . . . .  pron-char)' 
by [PRO] T,<f~o~uh~., fnumUh . . . .  fpersUhpers, k) 
where k = {reflexive}, if/3 is bound in ~b, and 
k = {pronominal}, otherwise. 
Condition: as before. 
Translation: as before. 
This rule enforces gender agreement between antecedent and anaphors: 
both the antecedent occurrence of PROn and the other (anaphor) occur- 
rences of PROn must have the same gender as the term to be sub- 
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stituted, else the result contains ambiguous morphological instructions 
and the sentence is ruled out. 
It appears that the theories of Reinhart, of Bach and Partee, and the 
analysis presented in this section make approximately the same predic- 
tion with respect o coreference relations. And improvements of one 
theory can easily be incorporated in others. What we try to show here is 
how the underlying theoretical framework determines the way in which 
the analysis is realized in the grammar. Thus, in Montague Grammar the 
principle of compositionality and the representation of meanings by 
intensions everely restrict the possibilities for imposing conditions at 
the level of semantic structures and lead to structural conditions on 
application of rules at a syntactic level. 
Thus, as in Reinhart's theory, in this version of Montague Grammar 
the syntactic structure of a sentence restricts the possible coreference 
relations. In Reinhart's theory, however, semantic relations are com- 
pletely determined by syntactic structure. For example, one quantifier 
can have wide scope over another iff the first quantifier c-commands the 
second. Consequently, sentence (22) has only one meaning, (23). 
(22) Every man loves a woman 
(23) Vx(man~(x) ~ 3y(woman~(y) ^ love~(x, y))) 
Our analysis takes over Montague's quantification mechanism, and 
therefore we also get 
(24) 3y(woman~(y) ^ Vx(man~(x)->love+(x, y))) 
Reinhart claims that (24) (which entails (23)) should be derived 
through a pragmatic mechanism that 'narrows' the interpretation (23) of 
(22) to (24). She justifies this 'narrowing'-mechanism by claiming that 
sentences having two logically independent readings (where narrowing 
does not work) form a marginal class. This, however, seems to be 
incorrect. Logically independent readings appear in all sorts of con- 
structions. For example, scope-ambiguities involving an opaque context 
(de dicto-de re distinctions) cannot be expressed in Reinhart's frame- 
work: sentence (25) has two logically independent readings, (26) and 
(27), of which (26) is the reading that is predicted by the c-command 
requirement; but (27) cannot be derived through a narrowing- 
mechanism. 
(25) Every schoolboy believes that a mathematician wrote 'Through 
the looking glass' 
(26) Vx(schoolboy~(x)->believe~(x, ^3y(mathematician~(y) ^ wrote~ 
(y, 'Through the looking glass')))) 
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(27) 3 y(mathematician~(y) ^ Vx(schoolboy~(x) -> believe~(x, 
^wrote~(y, 'Through the looking glass')))) 
If both readings of (25) should be represented (and we think so), then 
there is no reason to assign (22) only one reading. 
On the other hand, it is a known fact that not every sentence 
containing every and a has two readings; (28) has only a reading with 
wide scope of a: 
(28) A woman loves every man 
Reinhart considers uch examples as supporting her theory, which pre- 
dicts that the c-commanding quantifier has wide scope. In her theory the 
other reading is not available, since it cannot be derived from the first 
one by means of 'narrowing' principles. However, there are many 
arguments against his view, of which we only mention the following. In 
sentence (29) the only available reading is the one with wide scope of 
every over a, which argues strongly against Reinhart's c-command 
approach with respect o scope. 
(29) A medal is available at the finish for every participant 
In our opinion, (28) and (29) show that the semantic (and pragmatic) 
properties of the verb interfere with scope phenomena. It is not difficult 
to represent this in our framework. In general both readings are avail- 
able; semantic properties of the verb may sometimes induce restrictions 
on derivations, excluding one or another eading. In this way we get 
both the advantages of Reinhart's yntactic theory of anaphoric relations 
and Montague's explicit semantic theory of scope phenomena. 
Let us briefly summarize what our grammar now looks like. There is a 
set of concatenation rules, which build up structure (TV+ T ~ IV, 
T + IV ~ t, etc.). There is an anaphoric rule (schema), which is struc- 
ture-preserving, and operates on a term, a sentence and an indexing 
structure in that sentence. In this rule the difference between reflexives 
and ordinary pronouns is formalized as that between bound and free 
occurrences of indexed pronouns. The wellformedness constraint is 
satisfied in a version which allows as 'abstract symbols' labelled 
brackets, and indices (and features). The semantic operations cor- 
responding to our rule are well-defined IL-operations which preserve 
logical equivalence (functional application, ~-abstraction, etc.). It is 
clear that the compositionality principle is satisfied. 
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NOTES 
* A preliminary version of part of this paper appeared in Landman and Moerdijk (1981). 
While writing this preliminary version and the present paper we have profited from helpful 
discussions with Renate Bartsch, Theo Janssen, Henk van Riemsdijk, and, in particular, 
Jeroen Groenendijk and Martin Stokhof. We would like to thank them all. 
The first author gratefully acknowledges the support of part of this work by the 
Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO). 
i This restriction has to be weakened somewhat if substitution rules like the one in 
Landman and Moerdijk (1981) for Wh-substitution are incorporated in the grammar. 
2 Indexed pronouns PRO0, PRO1, PR(lh . . . .  (or more precisely [PRO0]r, [PRO1]r, 
[PRO:]T . . . .  ) are the syntactic variables which are called he0, heb he:, . . ,  in PTQ. An 
occurrence of an indexed pronoun PRO~ in a labelled bracketing & is a sub labelled 
bracketing [PRO~]T of qS. 
3 + and ~ are derivational symbols used in the formulation of the rules to indicate rule 
application: a ~i/3 means 'rule i applied to a yields/3'; a +/3 ~-~ stands for concatenation: 
'concatenation rule i applied to a and /3 yields 7'. For readability, rule names are 
suppressed. 
4 Engdahl (1980) gives another semantic analysis of non-coreference phenomena, but the 
mechanism that takes care of this, the Store Address Convention (Engdahl (1980), p. 85) is 
far from compositional. 
5 node a dominates node /3 iff there is a (possibly empty) path from a down to /3 
(dominate is reflexive). 
a properly dominates [3iff a dominates/3 and a ¢/3. 
6 This notion of antecedent differs from the one discussed in  Landman and Moerdijk 
(1981). There a notion of 'direct antecedent' is used, in order to obtain a 'stepwise' (one 
anaphor at a time) derivation of anaphoric structures. 
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